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ABSTRACT 
In an age of competition for top talent, lateral hiring or personnel poaching has flourished not just 
between rivals, but also among allies transcending across national borders. This article integrates the 
literature on lateral hiring and co-opetition to develop a “novel” perspective of the co-opetition-based 
view of lateral hiring. A conceptual framework was developed to account for conditions under co-
opetition setting in different markets. Contrary to the popular belief that poaching from rivals is more 
beneficial, the present research demonstrates that poaching from allies may be more beneficial in 
mitigating the “winner’s curse”. Indeed, poaching in the collaboration domain is characterized by 
greater access to information about the target employee before job change. Lateral hiring from allies 
in foreign markets can also be more beneficial given the potentially moderate stigma attached 
compared with those from domestic markets. The implications for firms and strategic human resource 
management literature are examined.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, human resource and strategy scholars have underscored the importance of 
human capital acquisition and utilization as essential for firms seeking to enter new markets (Adomako 
et al., 2019; Hayek et al., 2016; Ployhart et al., 2011; Pulakos et al., 2003). Indeed, competition for 
top talent has become more intense as more firms seek to expand across product ranges and national 
borders (Burton-Jones and Spender, 2009; Pennings and Wezel, 2007). The accelerated growth of 
many emerging economies has also ushered in a new and growing global competition for top talent 
(Kumar et al., 2015). One of the central questions of strategy research is why some firms fail and 
others flourish in the same environment (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; 
Amankwah-Amoah & Wang, 2019; Porter, 1991; Zhang et al., 2019). One possible explanation for 
this is rooted in some firms’ ability to identify, lure and retain top talent at the expense of others 
(Gardner et al., 2010). Accordingly, luring top talent from rival companies has come to be viewed as 
a key pillar in our understanding of how and why competitive advantages are lost and gained in many 
industries (Gardner, 2002; Groysberg and Lee, 2009; McNamara et al., 2013).  
A burgeoning stream of research has demonstrated the competitive advantage of firms in 
industries such as accounting, software development and management consulting has shifted from 
possession of physical assets to superior human capital (Gardner, 2002, 2005; Groysberg and 
Abrahams, 2006). This has led to intense competition for star performers to help transform 
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organizations. At the same time, parallel change has occurred as some firms have sought to enter into 
“no-poaching agreements” with the aim of restricting employees’ mobility (Gardner et al., 2010). In 
2012, the US Department of Justice and high-tech companies including Google, Adobe, Apple, Intel, 
Intuit and Pixar reached a USD 324 million settlement over the firms’ “no-poaching agreements” to 
stem poaching of each other’s employees (Farrell, 2013; Shy and Stenbacka, 2015). In an age of 
competition for top talent, lateral hiring or poaching as known by others, has flourished not only 
between rivals, but also among allies (Sullivan, 2008).  
Although a plethora of scholarly works has demonstrated human capital as one of the roots of 
sustained competitive advantage (Campbell et al., 2012), our understanding of lateral hiring in both 
competitive and collaboration settings remains severely limited. Although past studies have offered 
explanations for the dynamics of lateral hiring (Gardner, 2002; Gardner et al., 2010; Lazear, 1986), 
there remains no clear understanding about what factors determine firms’ decision to “poach” (lateral 
hiring) from either rivals or allies in either domestic or foreign markets. Furthermore, much of the 
existing body of knowledge pertaining to lateral hiring lacks a conceptual framework to articulate the 
contours and account for different factors influencing a firm’s decision on whether to poach from 
either domestic or foreign markets. Accordingly, the present study represents an effort to address this 
gap in the existing literature by examining the dynamics and effects of lateral hiring in a co-opetition 
setting, i.e. collaboration and competition domains, and in different types of markets. This focus is 
partially motivated by the fact that both international and domestic dimensions are the key scope of 
global businesses (Peng, 2018) and firms compete by leveraging others’ resources or relying on their 
resources and expertise (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a). 
The paper offers several modest contributions to the co-opetition and human capital research. 
First of all, although lateral hiring remains a strategy to acquire top talent among incumbents and 
emerging firms (see Gardner, 2002; Kumar et al., 2015), there is limited literature on the effects and 
drivers of lateral hiring from competitors and allies either in domestic or foreign markets. The present 
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research extends the existing streams of research by integrating the lateral hiring literature (Lazear, 
1986; Tranaes, 2001) and the concept of “co-opetition” (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; 
Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) to develop a “novel” perspective of the co-opetition-based view of lateral 
hiring. In addition, by integrating insights from cooperation and competition literature, the paper 
elucidates the conditions for the “winner’s curse” concept in lateral hiring and the effects (Perri, 1995). 
In so doing, the study responds to the growing streams of research which have suggested a need for a 
better conceptualization and articulation of the boundaries of the subject (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a; 
Gardner et al., 2010; Groysberg, 2010; Kumar et al., 2015). Additionally, in spite of the increasing 
recognition that lateral hiring is pivotal for firms seeking to operate in new markets (Amankwah-
Amoah et al., 2017; Groysberg, 2010), much of the existing literature has focused on poaching from 
rivals and offered little or no insights into poaching from allies. In light of this scholarly oversight, 
this study deviates from much of the existing literature by offering a unified analytical framework to 
account for the effects of poaching from allies and rivals and the interactions between the two.  
The rest of the arguments in this paper are presented in three steps. First, a review of the lateral 
hiring and co-opetition literature is presented. After this, the key building blocks to our 
conceptualization are identified and explicated. This is then followed by explanations and examination 
of the key pillars of the analytical framework. The final section sets out the theoretical and managerial 
implications. 
LATERAL HIRING: DEFINING A CONCEPT AND COMPONENTS 
One of the widely accepted premises in strategic human resource and strategy research is that superior 
human capital is an indispensable ingredient for superior organizational performance and success in 
both domestic and foreign markets (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011). It is 
widely noted in the strategic human resource literature that highly skilled individuals are more 
productive in responding to crisis, enacting and delivering change management, and identifying and 
resolving organizational problems (Gardner, 2002; Chambers et al., 1998). Indeed, acquiring 
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readymade top talent can equip firms to understand new challenges, develop new products and outwit 
rival firms (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2016, 2017). The knowledge-based view of the firm contends 
that competitive advantage can be traced to a firm’s ability to identify, acquire, create and utilize 
knowledge (Felin and Hesterly, 2007).  
According to research anchored in the resource-based perspective, one prerequisite for 
competitive advantage is a firm’s ability to identify and lure scarce top talent (Coff and Kryscynski, 
2011; Felin and Hesterly, 2007). For firms in knowledge-intensive industries such as high-tech and 
biotechnology, the ability to acquire top talent is considered one of the central pillars in gaining 
competitive advantage (Groysberg, 2010; Gardner et al., 2010). Human capital is a pivotal strategic 
asset of firms and difficult to curtail its mobility across organizational boundaries (Coff and 
Kryscynski, 2011; Ployhart et al., 2011). Anchored in the human capital perspective is lateral hiring, 
defined as a firm’s attempt to identify, contact and hire an individual or team currently employed by 
another firm without hint of unemployment (for a detailed review, see Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a). 
This is a kind of unsolicited offer to interviews which actually lead to job change, i.e. non-searching 
(McDonald, 2005; McDonald and Elder, 2006). This also provides opportunity for learning from other 
firms via employee mobility.  
Types of lateral hiring 
An important point to note about lateral hiring is that its manifestation rests on the assumption that 
there are a source/originating firm, outside/hiring firm and talent brokers, and the target employee 
(Gardner et al., 2010). There are two main types of lateral hiring, i.e. talent raiding (i.e. hiring a team 
away) and personnel poaching (i.e. hiring an individual away), both of which can occur within and 
across national borders (Rao and Drazin, 2002; Gardner et al., 2010). Human capital in the lateral 
hiring context refers to the knowledge, skills and abilities, which are more valuable to the recipient 
firm than the current firm (see also Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). Across the globe, scholars and 
practitioners have employed an array of terms including labor raiding, cherry-picking, contract 
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jumping, talent raiding, poaching, lift out and tapping-up to refer to lateral hiring (Gardner, 2002; 
Gardner et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2015). Scholars have also recognized that some employees develop 
new and superior sets of skills, knowledge and relational capital, which makes them distinctive and 
attractive to outside firms (Groysberg, 2010; Gardner, 2002). For some firms, engaging in lateral 
hiring means utilizing the services of a head-hunter to reach and recruit the target employee.  
Broadly speaking, the approaches adopted by poaching firms often depend on whether the 
knowledge held by the individual is firm-based, team-based or individual-specific (see also Campbell 
et al., 2012). These play a pivotal role in an outside firm’s decision on whether to lure a team or an 
individual. An excellent and famous example of talent raiding occurred when Yahoo lost a whole team 
to the software company, Nuance (Sullivan, 2008). The case of Amvescap and Deutsche Bank also 
illustrate this point. In 2007, Amvescap filed a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank alleging that the firm 
had sought to damage it by luring its 16 top managers responsible for 21% of its total asset (Kim, 
2014). Besides the acquisition accumulation of the highly skilled individuals, the hiring firm also 
inherited the social capital and networks of clients developed by the individuals during their previous 
employment. One growing but nascent branch of research has suggested that lateral hiring fosters the 
accumulation of social capital and learning (see Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a).  
Buoyed by the winds of change following today’s “war for talent”, many executives are hired 
into jobs without a hint of unemployment (McDonald and Elder, 2006; Sullivan, 2008). Lateral hiring 
is particularly attractive to many employers partly because during periods of unemployment, human 
capital can become obsolete in the face of changes in the business environment, thereby rendering an 
individual less productive in the hiring firm (Groysberg, 2010). From a strategic management 
perspective, lateral hiring can be viewed as a competitive move, instigated by an outside firm to lure 
an employee of a current firm to strengthen their market position whilst concurrently weakening the 
competitor’s (Groysberg, 2010; Gardner, 2002; Kumar et al., 2015). Extending this insight, personnel 
poaching can lead to an erosion of a firm’s competitive advantage whilst at the same time enabling 
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rivals to enhance their repertoire of knowledge and expertise (Gardner, 2002). It is worth noting that 
predatory hiring is an element of lateral hiring, where a firm seeks to eliminate a rival by luring its top 
talent (talent raiding) (Kim, 2014).  
Recent contributions to this stream of research suggest that lateral hiring can be seen as a means 
for firms to fill expertise gaps and gain access to highly skilled individuals without having to incur all 
their training and development costs (Panagiotakopoulos, 2012; Groysberg, 2010). Past studies have 
demonstrated that, constrained by limited advancement opportunities and poor job security within the 
current firm, many highly skilled employees are often forced to accept offers with superior conditions 
from outside firms (Panagiotakopoulos, 2012). A study by Fox (2010) uncovered that highly skilled 
and experienced engineers had high switching costs relative to younger engineers, and therefore were 
reluctant to accept encroachment and offers from outside firms.  
The “winner’s curse” 
Anchored in the notion of “portability of performance” is the suggestion that poaching would lead to 
replication of the same or superior performance in the recipient organizations (Groysberg, 2010; 
Groysberg et al., 2008). However, one of the unexpected outcomes of lateral hiring is the “winner’s 
curse” (Perri, 1995; Lazear, 1986) or bidder “misevaluation” curse. This is where managers 
“mistakenly believe substantial synergies exist in a deal, bid at excessive prices, and pay for targets 
more than they are actually worth” (Pereiro, 2016, p. 11). The overvaluation occurs when the hiring 
firm inadvertently misjudge the value of the target employee and overpay for their human capital. This 
is often attributed to a lack of visibility and information about the actual productivity and performance 
of the individual in the source firm (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a). The asymmetric information 
hypothesis contends that at the time of hiring, outside firms have limited information about the target 
employee and are at an informational disadvantage relative to the current employer. The recipient 
firms can utilize the poached employees to deliver sustainable advantage or might experience the 
“winner’s curse”. In a competitive situation, firms which lured a team or highly talented individual 
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are more likely to pay more and reward the individual or team handsomely more than their actual 
value (McNamara et al., 2013).  
THE CONCEPT OF CO-OPETITION 
Having set out the key features of lateral hiring, we now turn our attention to the concept of co-
opetition. The concept of co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000) refers to a situation where two or more competing firms are also co-operating in or around 
functional activities for their mutual benefit (Czakon et al., 2014). The simultaneous collaboration and 
competition can be geared towards targeting a market or product segment by combining their existing 
capabilities and resources (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016). Co-opetition is necessitated by factors such 
as declining product life cycles, rising cost of R&D and technology convergence (Gnyawali and Park, 
2009). A typical example of co-opetition is the recent decision by Toyota, the world’s largest 
carmaker, and BMW to pool their resources on fuel-cell technology (The Economist, 2015). In the 
wake of rising costs of research and development activities (see also You et al., 2019), co-opetition 
was seen as a means of helping to improve their competitiveness for the future. Even in the face of 
intense competitive rivals, some firms may opt to collaborate with their most formidable rival (Yu et 
al., 2013). A case in point is that of Ford and its arch-rival, GM, who have collaborated on high-
efficiency gearboxes (The Economist, 2015).  
In the light of increasing global competition, opportunities emerge for firms through 
collaboration to benchmark their own strengths and assemble necessary resources and expertise to 
improve their competitiveness (Gnyawali and Park, 2009). Past studies have demonstrated that co-
opetition in foreign markets may be propelled by the need for the partners to pool their resources and 
capabilities to help solidify their collective power in dealing with external stakeholders such as foreign 
and local governments (Luo, 2007). This is further re-enforced by the fact that competition between 
rival firms dilutes their bargaining power and ability to shape and influence national policy in foreign 
markets. By pooling their resources through collaboration, multinationals would be better positioned 
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to improve their competitiveness (Luo, 2007; Gnyawali et al., 2016). One stream of research has 
indicated that co-operating with rivals to innovate can actually strengthen the competitive bases of 
both firms (see Von Hippel, 1987).  
Amalgamating co-opetition and lateral hiring  
The co-opetition perspective is a bridge between competitors and allies, whilst each party concurrently 
pursues their activities in different arenas, representing an opportunity for poaching to occur within 
each arena. The occurrence of competition in one arena and collaboration in another provides the basis 
for market opportunism to occur (Czakon et al., 2014). Opportunism here refers to situations where 
one party in a collaboration setting decides to pursue an activity such as providing distorted 
information and violating the spirit of contractual arrangements that advances his/her self-interest at 
the expense of the other party (Luo, 2006, 2007). As many firms and countries have ushered in the 
“age of alliances” in an attempt to accrue synergistic benefits and improve efficiency, the tendency for 
opportunistic behavior to occur has also escalated (The Economist, 2015). As Luo (2007: 132) 
observed, “opportunism is pervasive and difficult to obviate” in a co-opetition setting given the loosely 
coupled nature of the relationship. A line of argument rooted in transaction cost theory and arguments 
(Williamson, 1975) contends that knowledge possession in a collaboration setting is subjected to the 
threat of opportunism by a partner through lateral hiring as rival firms may seek to acquire that 
knowledge and expertise by luring employees or even teams away from the current firm (see Gardner, 
2002).  
Under conditions of co-opetition, firms may engage in opportunistic behavior by sharing only 
limited knowledge whilst concurrently hiding some knowledge or siphoning some knowledge and 
expertise for use elsewhere after the end of the project or during the source of the project (Bengtsson 
and Kock, 2000). Researchers have recognized that some firms seek to accrue greater benefits from 
co-opetition during and after the alliance at the expense of the rival firms (Czakon et al., 2014; 
Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016). It has been suggested that largely due to rival firms’ superior resources 
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and expertise; some co-opetitors are often motivated to tap into their knowledge and expertise base 
for future use (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016).  
Although many firms venture into co-opetition arrangements to exploit new technologies and 
push the technology frontiers (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012), this quest also exposes them to other 
firms’ high performers with potential to poach. At the cornerstone of the co-opetition setting are the 
different power and resources bases of each of the partners (Bouncken and Fredrich, 2012). Powerful 
and resource-rich firms have considerable resources to raid the rival firms of their high performers. In 
a co-opetition setting, employees at the functional unit in the collaboration domain begin to recognize 
and notice the performance of individuals in each firm. The close observation of each other’s 
employees can provide rival firms with the opportunity to identify top performers, thereby providing 
a basis for future talent raiding. Poaching provides the basis for future value creation and capture. In 
a competitive environment, firms are motivated to pursue their own interests, take advantage of rivals 
by poaching their talented individuals and exploit knowledge leakage. Co-opetition does not counter 
poaching activities by any of the firms or talent brokers (third-party recruiters) hired to work on their 
behalf. The arguments thus far suggest that unlike the competitive domain, collaboration can facilitate 
the transfer of valuable information from one partner to another.  
A CO-OPETITION PERSPECTIVE OF LATERAL HIRING: A TYPOLOGY 
In order to develop a conceptual framework to capture the features of the co-opetition perspective of 
lateral hiring, it is contended that there are different parties with varying motives in a co-opetition 
setting (Fernandez et al., 2014). It is suggested that lateral hiring, just like co-opetition, encompasses 
two opposing concepts: collaboration and competition domains. This is where a focal firm has both 
competitors and allies (outside/current firm) whose employees are potential targets for poaching. The 
co-opetition-based view contends that firms can simultaneously cooperate in some key areas such as 
research and development, whilst they compete against each other in other domains such as promotion. 
Following this line of reasoning, the opportunity to poach from the two main domains is available to 
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hiring firms. In the competing domains, the lack of information about the target employee is more 
likely to lead to the “winner’s curse”, whereas in the collaboration domain access to each other’s 
workers and knowledge about star performers means that poaching is more likely to be advantageous 
to the recipient firm and has potential to eliminate the “winner’s curse”. At the root of the co-opetition 
perspective of lateral hiring is the suggestion that firms can simultaneously compete and cooperate 
with rivals in both domestic and foreign markets, with each domain representing a potential avenue 
for firms to poach strategically to minimize the adverse effects and amplify the benefits.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
For analytical clarity, the co-opetition view suggests cooperating in one domain (allies/non-
competitors) and competing in another (rival). Lateral hiring allies include alliance partners and 
collaborators. It contends that a focal firm broadly competes in two main domains, i.e. domestic and 
foreign. Building on the above insights, four key dimensions (lateral hiring from allies or rivals vs. 
lateral hiring from domestic or foreign markets) were identified. Crossing the two types of markets 
with the two dynamics of co-opetition, produces a 2 x 2 matrix of the types of lateral hiring, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. From the competition angle of the above discussions, two elements were 
deduced (i.e. Quadrant I: lateral hiring from rivals in domestic markets and Quadrant IV: lateral hiring 
from rivals in foreign markets). From the collaboration dimension, two elements were deduced (i.e. 
Quadrant II: lateral hiring from allies in domestic markets and Quadrant III: lateral hiring from allies 
in foreign markets). It is contended that there are different precipitating factors and effects depending 
on the arenas from which the firm poaches, i.e. domestic or foreign markets, and whom they poach 
from, i.e. rivals or allies. The four-quadrant typology of lateral hiring represents angles to view the 
subject. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to explicating the features and dynamics of the 
quadrants.  
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Quadrant I: Lateral Hiring from Rivals in Domestic Markets 
Quadrant I is where a firm is motivated by a host of factors to lure a team or an individual from a rival 
firm in the domestic market. One of the reasons for poaching is that many domestic small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are increasingly reluctant to invest their limited financial resources in training 
workers because of the risk that the employee would be poached by rival firms with generous rewards 
and promotional opportunities (Panagiotakopoulos, 2012). For many SMEs, training is regarded as a 
costly activity, the benefits of which are accrued by rival and large firms (Hendry, Arthur and Jones, 
1995; Panagiotakopoulos, 2012). One possible explanation is the poor financial rewards, employment 
conditions and little job security associated with SMEs, which often means that target employees cave 
in to outside offers with superior conditions associated with large firms and multinationals 
(Panagiotakopoulos, 2012). These serve as disincentives to staff training and development (Hendry et 
al., 1995), thereby encouraging personnel poaching.  
Recent contributions in the literature have also suggested that firms characterized by under-
investment in human capital often struggle to enter and compete in both national and international 
markets (Al Ariss, 2014). In an attempt to address such deficits for domestic expansion, poaching from 
local rivals often appears an attractive avenue to secure ready-made talent for faster expansion (Al 
Ariss, 2014; Ionides et al., 2007). Besides the precipitating factors, poaching from rivals can have the 
detrimental effect of altering the competitive positions of both the outside and current firms (Kim, 
2014). Firms that are successful in poaching from an “eternal foe” can weaken rivals whilst at the 
same time fortifying their own position. Indeed, poaching can also carry the added benefit of equipping 
the recipient firm with new sources of knowledge and creativity (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a, 2015b).  
In addition to acquiring the external knowledge, lateral hiring also delivers an opportunity to 
the recipient firms to view their current problems from a different perspective with the aim of fostering 
innovation (Perry-Smith 2006). However, anti-poaching agreements can limit domestic poaching from 
rivals. To illustrate this quadrant, we turn to the recent cases of Apple and Google. In 2013, it was 
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uncovered that they had a gentleman’s agreement not to poach each other’s employees. Indeed, the 
two tech companies had concluded that by steering away from poaching each other’s employees, both 
firms could benefit financially (Farrell, 2013). It has also been suggested that pay secrecy can prevent 
personnel poaching by keeping rival firms “from knowing what they must offer to lure good 
employees away” (Colella et al., 2007: 62). One study on the Indian market has demonstrated that 
firms that poach locally are perceived as “more business-minded” and competitive, whilst concurrently 
viewed as “less ethical” (Kumar et al., 2015). In recent years, some of the traditional “no-poaching” 
agreements between rival firms have often been “put aside, leaving corporate recruiters to act as 
external search firms and freely raid other organizations’ employees” (Pulakos et al., 2003: 160). In 
this competition setting, there is a high degree of decision-making uncertainty stemming from the fact 
that the hiring firms’ decision to poach is based on incomplete information about the attributes of the 
individual performance, which could ultimately lead to the occurrence of the “winner’s curse” 
(Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993; Golan, 2005; Waldman, 1990). 
Quadrant II: Lateral Hiring from Allies in Domestic Markets 
Quadrant II is often restricted or prohibited by a memorandum of understanding between alliance 
members not to poach other’s employees. One important explanation for this quadrant is that some 
firms act opportunistically by poaching from allies to strengthen their position. Trust has been 
recognized as a building block of inter-firm collaboration as well as co-opetition (Devetag, 2009). 
Therefore, raiding collaborators’ employees could undermine the basis of the collaboration and lead 
to termination of the relationship. One stream of research suggests that some multinationals engage in 
opportunistic behavior by luring top talent form alliance partners, customers and suppliers with 
superior benefits and employment opportunities (see Muskin, 2000). In some quarters, this can be 
viewed as some kind of “exploitation of relative power” by the MNEs leading to a job change for the 
target employee (Muskin, 2000: 292). Indeed, poaching from partners often occurs under conditions 
of access to some employees’ information. Such actions might also be perceived as violating not only 
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the written rules of the collaborative arrangement, but also unwritten ones. Each firm’s ability to 
observe others’ employees and their performance indicates that poaching here is more likely to 
mitigate the “winner’s curse”. One possible explanation is that some managers and human resource 
executives are reluctant to poach from allied firms for fear that the other firms would retaliate (see 
Sullivan, 2008). For instance, in the United States, some managers and corporate recruiters at times 
shy away from poaching from partners on the grounds that it is “unethical” and poses the risk of 
undermining the basis of the relationship (Gardner et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2005a, 2005b). As Mesquita 
(2007: 75) puts it, “distrust in some domains is known to increase the levels of distrust in other 
domains”. Furthermore, when firms cooperate to share R&D costs, the need to poach from the partner 
is reduced. However, anti-poaching arrangements can curtail each firm’s behavior and limits 
employees’ ability to obtain maximum reward for their labor (Shy and Stenbacka, 2015). In a similar 
vein, poaching from allies may lead to a partner’s decision to end cooperation in an attempt to protect 
its key assets. The potential effects of personnel poaching on firms and their ability to innovate and 
compete tend to vary.  
Quadrant III: Lateral Hiring from Allies in Foreign Markets 
In light of increasing global competition, more firms have broadened the scope of their lateral hiring 
activities to include foreign markets (Ionides, Endres, Pilling and Sobie, 2007; Sheldon and Li, 2013). 
One motive is firms seeking growth in new foreign markets. Many have sought to lure ready-made 
talent such as executives by poaching from other firms in the market already (Ionides et al., 2007; 
Baker, 2006). Poaching from allied firms already in foreign markets enriches the expertise base for 
the focal firm and its ability to compete. Another motive is that many market-seeking firms have 
employed poaching as a means of achieving faster growth in international markets by luring ready-
made talent and bypassing training and development costs (Ionides et al., 2007). To illustrate this 
quadrant, we turn to the global airline industry. Over the years, alliances have shifted from firm versus 
firm to group versus group as such alliances have congregated around the airline alliance groupings 
such as Oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance (Lazzarini, 2007; Gomes-Casseres, 2003). These 
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alliances share resources and expertise around the globe, which help to improve the competitiveness 
of their members. Although many airlines engage in alliances around the globe, they also concurrently 
poach pilots, engineers, executives, cabin crew and line managers from rivals to help to expand into 
new developing markets (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2011). Indeed, compared with domestic 
markets, foreign markets can be seen by the hiring firm as distant and less stigmatizing or guilt-
inducing when poaching from allies (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015a). By stigma, we are referring to 
“some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular context” 
(Crocker, Major, and Steele, 1998: 505). In light of the increasing internationalization of firms, the 
effects of poaching are likely to be shaped by the eventual destination of the poached employee. When 
a firm poaches in foreign market with the aim of keeping employee at that market, this might carry a 
"moderate stigma". However, cross-border poaching from allies can undermine the basis of 
relationship with the alliance partners and carry higher risk of stigmatization. 
Beyond the positive effects of poaching from the allies, poaching talent such as executives, 
engineers and country managers from allies in a different country may hamper their basis of trust. 
Although anti-poaching agreements or “no cold call” agreements often exclude poaching from allies 
as a recruitment strategy (Shy and Stenbacka, 2015), this often applies to only the domestic market of 
the parties. As such, there are few or no barriers to firms seeking to poach from abroad. Furthermore, 
anti-poaching agreements and cross-border poaching is often extremely difficult to enforce or restrict. 
It is also worth noting that hiring exclusively from non-competitors (allies) could mean that the 
poached employee would be without experience in the functional area in question or the industry 
(Sullivan, 2005b).  
Quadrant IV: Lateral Hiring from Rivals in Foreign Markets 
Today’s global economy is increasingly characterized by knowledge-based competition, where firms 
compete for top talent as an ingredient for international success irrespective of their geographical 
location, thereby increasing the trend of poaching from rivals in foreign markets (Pulakos et al., 2003). 
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This quadrant represents poaching from competing firms in foreign markets. One possible explanation 
is that when local demand for a particular expertise (e.g. doctors, engineers and scientists) outstrips 
supply on the local market, many firms are forced to poach from foreign markets in an attempt to fill 
expertise gaps within their organizations (Singh et al., 2003; Sheldon and Li, 2013). In recent years, 
many healthcare organizations in the developed world have lured nurses and doctors from hospitals in 
developing countries to fill expertise gaps in their organizations (Nelson, 2004; Singh et al., 2003). 
Global firms have often employed talent brokers to act as intermediaries in contacting and recruiting 
highly skilled individuals in foreign countries. Much of the hiring here is predicated on enticing 
financial rewards offered and perceived new opportunities in the new organization and country which 
often supersedes other motivations. Arguably, poaching from far away locations may carry moderate 
stigma (see Hamori, 2010), if the poached employee is kept in that market. For many Western firms, 
establishing a foothold in emerging economies is often clouded by lack of understanding of the “rules 
of the game” (North, 1990). The “newness” of foreign markets to MNEs often prompts them to lure 
individuals with the right set of expertise currently employed by rivals in the country in question. 
Indeed, many Western-based firms seeking to enter fast-growing emerging markets have often 
poached top talent from rival emerging-market firms to help them gain access to local knowledge and 
expertise in a timely manner (see Ionides et al., 2007; Baker, 2006). Buoyed by success at home, 
emerging firms’ expansion to new countries often required poaching from local rivals to give them 
access to local knowledge and expertise ex (see also Sullivan, 2005a). Owing to the acquisition of star 
performers through lateral hiring, many companies including SMEs and MNEs gain access to top 
talent for immediate internationalization take-off (Ionides et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2005a). Besides, 
poaching from rivals in foreign markets enables them to gain access to ready-made top talent rather 
than spending years developing talent internally through employee training and development 
(Sullivan, 2005a; Cappelli, 2008). It also enables the focal firm to weaken the competitors in the 
market just before or after entry.  
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to explicate the dynamics of lateral hiring in a co-opetition setting, i.e. 
simultaneous collaboration and competition. In so doing, a “novel” theory of the co-opetition-based 
view of lateral hiring was advanced, which contends that the simultaneous cooperation in an area and 
competition in another represents opportunities for firms to poach strategically to minimize the 
negative effects and amplify the benefits. Building on the contention that firms compete in both 
domestic and foreign markets as well as being able to poach from both allies and rivals, a four-quadrant 
framework was developed which accounts for the underlying factors which influence firms’ decisions 
to either poach from rivals or allies. Regarding the effects of lateral hiring, an important insight 
stemming from our analysis is that the effects of lateral hiring from rivals and allies in both the 
competing and collaboration domains tend to differ.  
Our theoretical analyses suggest that poaching in competitive settings (either domestic or 
foreign markets) creates conditions for “winner’s curse” to occur largely due to limited information 
about the target employee. However, in a collaboration domain, whether domestic or foreign, there is 
greater potential for mitigation of the “winner’s curse”. This is partly due to information flow between 
the partners on individual performance. Under such conditions, poaching from allies may be as 
beneficial as poaching from rivals. This analysis raises some questions about the widely held view that 
poaching from rivals is more beneficial, largely due to the dual effects of strengthening the hiring firm, 
whilst concurrently weakening the rival firm. Nevertheless, poaching from allies has potential to 
undermine the basis of trust and collaboration, whereas poaching from rivals may weaken their 
expertise base and ability to compete. Taken together, the conceptual framework demonstrate that co-
opetition offers opportunity for outside firms to gain access to information and knowledge about 
individual performance prior to poaching and is thereby better able to mitigate the effects of the 
“winners curse”. Indeed, firms’ ability to accrue benefits from poaching from rivals may hinge on 
whether it occurs in a domestic or foreign market.  
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Contributions to Theory  
The study stands to make key contributions to strategic human resource management research. First, 
although a vast body of research has examined lateral hiring from rivals (Gardner, 2002, 2005; Gardner 
et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2015; Lazear, 1986), limited attention has been paid to lateral hiring from 
allies and whether such actions can be beneficial. In this direction, the study advances an argument to 
counter the existing view that only poaching from rivals is more beneficial. The analysis indicates that, 
in the competitive setting, there is little or no incentive for the current firm to reveal information about 
the attributes of employee performance to outside firms. Therefore, poaching under such 
circumstances is more likely to lead to the winners’ curse. On the other hand, in a collaboration setting, 
firms have more opportunities to observe each other’s employees. Therefore, lateral hiring from allies 
might be more beneficial than from rivals in mitigating the “winners’ curse”. Besides, by 
conceptualizing and articulating the features of each of the four domains, this article addresses a core 
topic of strategic human resource management of “portable” human capital (Groysberg, 2010) and 
strategy of how some firms lose their competitive edge and ability to compete. Specifically, our 
analysis contributes to strategic human resource and lateral hiring literature (Gardner, 2002; Groysberg 
and Lee, 2009) by articulating and deepening our understanding of how competitive advantages are 
lost and gained in a co-opetition setting. In addition, the study develops a framework to capture the 
contours of lateral hiring within the context of co-opetition. Thus, contributes to the growing body of 
research on human capital or talent flows (Groysberg, 2010; Tung, 2008). 
Practical implications 
The study has important implications for practicing managers. First, our conceptual framework 
underscores that for firms with a strong global footprint, poaching from further afield has the capability 
of reducing any potential “ethics” issues and stigmatization after poaching. By widening the scope of 
their poaching activities to include both domestic and foreign markets, firms would be better able to 
engage in strategic lateral hiring to accrue the maximum benefits. Second, resource-seeking firms 
should seek to develop stronger employment branding, which entice applicants and convey a positive 
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impression to outsiders that the firm is the best place to work (Dineen and Allen, 2016; Fee and 
Hadlock, 2003). This helps in enticing skilled workers to the organization and helps to overcome the 
problem of talent shortage. Besides developing employment branding, our study also indicates that 
poaching from allies might be more beneficial than poaching from rivals in a co-opetition 
environment. Notwithstanding the potential gains of different the types of lateral hiring, the timing is 
likely to be firm-specific with some firms opting for during the cooperation whilst others after the 
alliance/collaboration. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
The analysis should be viewed in light of the limitations. First of all, the notion of a firm competing 
in two domains and lateral hiring from allies and rivals applies to very few firms. Indeed, many small 
businesses do not have a collaboration dimension in their operations. This limits the generalizability 
of the conceptual model. The analysis presented here demonstrates a need for a much broader 
conceptualization of lateral hiring to account for factors such as cooperation between rivals and allies 
and how that might influence how it is initiated and carried out. In addition, context-specificity of 
human capital may limit its mobility across national borders or industry, which has not been fully 
accounted for by our conceptualization. It has been suggested that externally acquired knowledge 
might have to be adapted and transformed to enhance it usability in new contexts (Nonaka, 1994). 
Therefore, there is a need for further research to seek to broaden our conceptualization to account for 
this shortcoming. 
In the light of these limitations, there are promising avenues for future research. First, future 
research could probe further into the concurrent effects for both lateral hiring from allies and rivals on 
firms’ overall performance. Indeed, much of the existing body of research pertaining to lateral hiring 
has focused on the issue of poaching from rivals in a domestic market. Although this domain has 
received most and increasing scholarly attention, there is a need to redirect scholarly attention to the 
other domains and their potential effects of lateral hiring and how they unfold over time. Such analysis 
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and cross-domain analysis would help to provide a clearer understanding of the contours of lateral 
hiring. Given the no consideration to the size of the focal firm, stage of internationalization, and modes 
of internationalization strategy, future study should seek to consider these issues in advancing our 
understanding of this hiring strategy in the international context.  
In addition, at times, the success of poaching depends on a recipient firm’s ability to restrict 
successive mobility of individuals through incentives such as pay, “gentleman’s agreement” and 
bonus. An important first step in this regard and a promising avenue for future research is an 
examination and determination of whether poached employees have a greater tendency relative to 
other employees, to jump ship. Additional attention is needed to examine the retention of employees 
under each of the four quadrants. Another avenue worthy of further scholarly attention is to examine 
the long-term effects of poaching from allies on a focal firm’s existing relationships. Furthermore, 
different types of alliances were not considered and present fruitful areas for future research. Finally, 
lateral hiring remains a growing phenomenon, it is hoped that this conceptualization will ignite new 
streams of research on the subject.  
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Figure 1: A typology of co-opetition perspective of lateral hiring 
 
 
 
